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Regional  cooperation  arrangements  (RCAs)  have  produced  vastly  dissimilar 
performances;  some  have  spurred  remarkable  expansion  in  trade  and  cooperation 
among  members,  while  several  others  have  achieved  little.  Studies  show  that 
performances vary because RCAs differ from one another in important characteristics, 
namely  the  (i)  objectives  they  aim  to  achieve,  (ii)  balance  of  power  among  member 
states, and (iii) political structures and processes of decision-making within individual 
member states. Subject characteristics uniquely influence and condition the functioning 
of RCAs. An assessment of the performance of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) reveals that the extremely skewed balance of power within the 
region  and  antagonistic  inter-state  relations  among  member  states  have  stunted  the 
organization‘s effectiveness. To reverse the situation, SAARC‘s member countries need 
to repair the prevailing atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, and build cordial inter-state 
relations. They also need to empower the SAARC Secretariat to function as a competent 
and neutral facilitator of cooperation in South Asia. 
 
 
Keywords: South Asia, regional cooperation arrangements, South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, SAARC, political economy, trade, economic integration 
 






























  The number of regional cooperation arrangements (RCAs) has grown multifold 
since  the  early  1990s,  with  several  new  ones  are  being  formed  every  year. 
Despite  their  popularity,  however,  RCAs  have  not  always  lived  up  to 
expectations. Some have been very successful while several have been less so, 
and  still  others  have  collapsed  or  become  dysfunctional  not  long  after  being 
established. Research into the relative performance of RCAs tends to consider 
all RCAs to be identical and aimed at promoting trade and economic integration 
among member countries, and, as such, primarily driven by the logic of trade and 
economic opportunities. In reality, however, all RCAs are not identical and they 
differ from one another in several important aspects, including the pursuit of non-
economic  objectives  such  as  regional  stability  and  protection  against  external 
threats. Moreover, the balance of power among member states, as well as their 
respective political structures and processes, uniquely conditions the functioning 
of individual RCAs. A thorough assessment of RCA performance needs to take 
all of these factors into account.  
 
  An assessment of the 25-year performance of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) using the above approach reveals the dominant 
influence  of  interstate  power  relationships  and  the  impact  of  internal  political 
forces.  SAARC  is  characterized  by  an  extreme  imbalance  of  power  among 
member  states,  with  India  enjoying  more  than  a  threefold  advantage  over  all 
other  members  combined  in  terms  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  and 
population, as well as considerable military prowess. Several SAARC members, 
therefore,  perceive  India  as  a  risk  to  their  security  and  a  source  of  possible 
economic domination. Such perceptions are aggravated by a lack of trust and 
poor interstate relations, particularly between India and Pakistan. Consequently, 
several SAARC members have made security arrangements with extra-regional 
players  and  externalized  bilateral  issues  vis-à-vis  India,  which  has  further 
strained relations with India and exacerbated an environment of suspicion and 
distrust in the region. 
 
  These  regional  dynamics  have  stunted  trade  and  cooperation  by  (i)  pushing   
members  to  restrict  trade  and  economic  exchanges  with  India  in  order  to 
moderate  the  risk  of  economic  domination;  and  (ii)  making  the  progress  of 
regional  cooperation  dependent  upon  the  status  of  relations  among  member 
states,  rather  than  on  economic  opportunities,  thereby  introducing  uncertainty 
and  arbitrary  factors  into  the  cooperation  process.  This  severely  hampers 
SAARC‘s achievements in promoting trade and economic integration. SAARC, 
however, has succeeded in contributing to the moderation of tensions among 
member  states  by  enabling  the  region‘s  leaders  to  interact  in  a  cooperative 
framework  through  its  summit  meetings.  These  occasions  have  helped  the 
region's leaders to develop firsthand assessments of one another‘s views and, in 
some instances, facilitated high-level political decision-making.  
  
 
  Uncertainty  about  further  progress  in  cooperation  has  prompted  individual 
member  states—mainly  India  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  Pakistan—to  conclude 
preferential trade and cooperation arrangements with willing states from within 
and outside the region. This trend will likely contribute to trade liberalization and 
integration in South Asia, albeit in a fragmented manner that bypasses the South 
Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and SAARC platforms.     
 
  Trade liberalization and integration in the region, even in a truncated form, has 
the  potential  to  yield  considerable  benefits  to  participating  SAARC  members. 
However, given the defining constraints of interstate relations on cooperation in 
South Asia, further progress will be contingent upon erasing the ―trust deficit‖ that 
exists  and  creating  improved  relations  among  member  states.  If  distrust  and 
suspicion persist and interstate relations remain shaky, smaller SAARC members 
will  continue  to  be  wary  of  further  deepening  their  integration  with  the  Indian 
economy. As the preeminent member state, India needs to take the initiative in 
building  better  relations  in  the  region  by  allaying  other  members‘  security 
concerns and fears of domination. Other members, in turn, need to acknowledge 
India‘s  primacy  in  the  region  and  recognize  that  integration  with  the  Indian 
economy  could  help  them  overcome  the  constraints  of  market  size  and 
geography.  
 
  Improved  interstate  relations  would  provide  an  enabling  environment  for 
economic cooperation. Yet, it is also necessary to effectively address two other 
deficits in the region: the ―institutional capacity deficit‖ and the ―trade account 
deficit.‖ The lack of institutional capacity to support and implement cooperative 
programs  in  the  region  has  hampered  progress  towards  integration.  Such 
capacity  needs  to  be  rapidly  built-up  by  empowering  and  strengthening  the 
SAARC  Secretariat  to  promote,  support,  and  monitor  SAARC  initiatives,  and 
persuade  members  to  work  together  in  managing  the  region‘s  collective 
challenges and exploiting its opportunities. Proposals of critical significance to 
the region, such as development of the region‘s shared rivers, are unlikely to 
move forward without a strong and effective Secretariat.  
 
  The progress of cooperation within SAARC, particularly in intra-regional trade, is 
facing the constraint of widening trade account deficits between India and smaller 
member economies. Lower tariffs and trade barriers in these smaller economies 
have  led  to  rapidly  expanding  imports  from  India,  while  supply  constraints  in 
partner countries have failed to expand exports proportionately. There is a need 
to upgrade and diversify the supply structures of smaller member economies to 
expand their export capacity and attain sustainable trade account balances with 
India and others. Towards this purpose, the smaller member countries need to 
introduce  policies  and  measure  to  attract  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and 
technology  from  all  sources,  including  India.  It  is  also  necessary  to  ramp  up 
operations  of  the  SAARC  Development  Fund  to  provide  adequate  support  to 
member  countries‘  programs  for  upgrading  and  diversifying  their  respective 
economies.   The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia  |       1 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The number of regional cooperation arrangements (RCAs)
1 in effect around the globe 
has  more  than  doubled  since  the  early  1990s  to  about  380  by  2007.
2  Several 
developments  have  contributed  to  the  explosive  growth  in  these  regional  initiatives. 
Arguably, the demonstrated success of European nations in building a prosperous and 
stable European Union (EU) has been the most influential factor.  
 
Dissatisfaction with the slow and complex process of multilateral trade negotiations, in 
which  most  members  have  only indirect  and  limited  participation, has  also  prompted 
several countries to embrace RCAs as their preferred option for strengthening market 
access  and  trade  growth. The  RCA  process  offers  a  relatively  expeditious  and  clear 
negotiating path, active participation and a voice for individual members, and customized 
and  flexible  arrangements  (Fiorentino,  Verdeja,  and  Toqueboeuf,  2007).    Moreover, 
developing countries are concerned about growing protectionist sentiment in developed 
economies and the evolution of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) 
and EU into powerful trading blocs. Regionalism is seen as a means of safeguarding 
individual members‘ access to regional markets and leveraging their collective strength 
in trade negotiations. At a more basic level, the declining influence of hegemonic powers 
such  as  the  United  States  (US)  in  global  affairs  has  probably  resulted  in  a  reduced 
supply of public goods (e.g., the resolution of collective problems) needed for the smooth 
functioning of the international system and prompted the growth of regionalism. 
 
The  formation  of  an  RCA  heralds  potential  changes  in  pre-existing  political  and 
economic relationships among member states, as well as between them and the rest of 
the world. For this reason, the explosive growth of RCAs could be counted among the 
most important developments in world politics during the past 25 years (Dash, 2008). 
Moreover, the proliferation of RCAs, of which more than 85% are reportedly focused on 
trade,  has  significant  implications  on  the  global  trading  system.  Notwithstanding  the 
enthusiasm with which RCAs have been embraced by most countries around the world, 
the track record of RCAs‘ achievements has been mixed. More than 40% of notified 
RCAs  have  become  obsolete  or  extinct  since  their  establishment.  Formation  of  the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1957, for instance, was accompanied 
by  formation  of  two  equally  large  and  ambitious  RCAs:  the  European  Free  Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). While the 
ECSC evolved into the highly effective EU over the following 5 decades, the latter two 
RCAs became dysfunctional within a few years after coming into existence. 
 
                                            
1   The  term  ―regional  cooperation  arrangement‖  (RCA)  is  used  to  include  all  forms  of  cooperation 
structures  between  two  or  more  nations  that  are  usually  from  a  common  geographic  region, 
although RCAs among cross-regional nations are rising in number. Nation states form RCAs to 
achieve economic and non-economic objectives, which may include some or all of the following: 
trade liberalization and economic integration, enhancement of regional peace and stability, security 
cooperation, management of common opportunities and challenges, and development of shared 
resources, infrastructure and facilities.  
2   This estimate is reported by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The actual number of RCAs is 
likely to be higher since the WTO data reports only trade-related RCAs.    
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has successfully evolved into a 
well-knit and dynamic regional entity that is now a major force behind several economic 
cooperation initiatives between the Southeast Asian economies and the rest of the world. 
ASEAN has also begun to actively promote interaction with non-members on issues of 
regional  security.  Likewise,  the  younger  Greater  Mekong  Sub-Regional  (GMS) 
arrangement  has  registered  impressive  achievements  on  a  more  modest  scale.  For 
example,  GMS  has  been  effective  in  catalyzing  cooperation  among  once  adversarial 
countries to develop joint infrastructure facilities and systems in the sub-region, and is 
seen as a model for flexible yet effective cooperation by many developing countries. 
Moreover,  the  groundwork  for  cooperation  established  under  the  GMS  is  facilitating 
smoother  integration  of  some  of  Southeast  Asia‘s  least  developed  economies  into 
ASEAN. On the other hand, several other RCAs in the region—including Asia–Pacific 
Economic  Cooperation  (APEC),  Asia–Pacific  Trade  Agreement  (APTA),  the  Bay  of 
Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—appear to be works-in-
progress as their achievements to date have been limited. This raises an interesting 
question: why do performances vary significantly among RCAs. 
 
This  paper  suggests  that  performances  vary  from  one  RCA  to  another  because  the 
underlying  forces  that  characterize  and  influence  the  arrangements  vary  as  well.  To 
understand variations in RCA performances, therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
underlying forces that characterise individual RCAs. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines major explanations of the 
logic and process of regionalism. Section 3 discusses the underlying economic and non-
economic forces that characterize and condition individual RCAs. This section also looks 
at  the  evolution  and  performance  of  selected  RCAs,  and  attempts  to  relate  their 
experience to the outlined explanations. Section 4 takes a closer look at the background 
in  which  SAARC  was  established,  and  discusses  conditions  in  which  it  operates. 
Section 5 reviews SAARC‘s past performance and emerging trends in the region, and 
offers observations on the likely course of developments for SAARC. The last section 
outlines issues for consideration. 
 
 
2.  Regionalism Defined 
 
International relations theorists offer several explanations of regionalism to answer the 
following  question:  why  do  states  cooperate  and  commit  themselves  to  comply  with 
agreed sets of rules, thereby accepting some constraint on their policy autonomy and 
even sovereignty. The explanations are briefly outlined below in two broad categories: (i) 
power-centric and (ii) institutionalist. 
 
2.1  Power-Centric View 
 
The power-centric view of regionalism considers the international system to be anarchic 
by nature, which pressures individual nation states to acquire power and maximize self 
interest to ensure their own security. As a result, the political–military power of nation 
states and its distribution among them holds critical influence over inter-state relations. The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia  |       3 
 
 
Coexistence  among  nation  states  in  such  situations  can  only  be  achieved  through 
frequent  realignments  of  the  balance  of  power  against  each  other.  Following  this 
reasoning,  power-centrists  see  regionalism  as  a  response  of  nation  states  within  a 
region  to  power  projection  by  powerful  (hegemonic)  state/s  from  outside  the  region. 
When such actions are perceived to threaten their security, the states may form an RCA 
to pool their resources together for collectively countering the external adversary. If the 
hegemonic state happens to be from within the region, the states may also consider 
forming a RCA in order to involve the subject state in a cooperative framework so as to 
moderate its exercise of power. Likewise, they may form RCAs when such arrangements 
reflect a convergence of their respective national interests, such as when states band 
together to leverage their collective strength in international forums for obtaining better 
terms  than  they  possibly  would  individually.  Lastly,  a  hegemonic  state  may  itself 
encourage formation of an RCA to reduce the costs of coordination it has traditionally 
provided to its smaller allies. The power-centric view also maintains that the presence of 
a powerful or hegemonic state is highly desirable since it can act as focal, or pivotal, 
player and resolve the collective action problem. 
 
Power-centric  views  thus  provide  important  insights  into  how  power  relations  among 
member states influence RCA performance. 
 
Power-centric  views,  however,  offer  only  a  partial  explanation  of  why  nation  states 
cooperate.  While  power  relations  among  states  are  important,  they  do  not  seem  to 
explain establishment of several RCAs in recent years. Moreover, research finds that the 
presence of a hegemonic state is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure an RCA‘s 
success. Perhaps the main criticism of the power-centric explanation is that it visualizes 
the  state  to  be  a  unified,  undifferentiated  entity  that  alone  defines  what  constitutes 
national  interests  and  pursues  these  interests  through  its  international  relations, 
including RCAs. The assumption of a unified state can be challenged since it ignores the 
various constituents of a state, their influences on and preferences for defining national 
interests, and the role and motivations of national decision-makers. 
 
Despite such limitations, the power-centric viewpoint offer three important insights that 
have  significant  bearing  on  the  performance  of  RCAs.  It  finds  that  nation  states  will 
pursue regional integration only to the extent they can enhance their national interests. 
This can result in uneven commitment to regional integration on the part of individual 
members. Secondly, since trade can potentially enhance the political–military capacities 
of states through efficiency gains, it can also influence power relations among member 
states. For this reason, states are more likely to expand trade with political–military allies 
than with actual or potential adversaries (Mansfield and Bronson, 1997). This finding 
suggests  that  the  effectiveness  of  an  RCA  to  promote  trade  and  cooperation  may 
depend on the political–military relations among its member states. If subject relations 
are cordial, cooperation may progress more than in instances where relations are less 
cordial. 
 
Power-centrists also find that the (real or perceived) unequal distribution of gains from 
RCAs  among  member  states  is  likely  to  limit  cooperation,  unless  measures  to 
compensate  the  disadvantaged  states  are  put  in  place.  The  reality  or  perception  of 
unequal gains for weaker members may arise because the more powerful members may  
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appropriate to themselves the bulk of the gains owing to their greater market power and 
bargaining clout. However, similar outcome could also result from the process of trade 
and  economic  liberalization,  since  a  disproportionately  higher  burden  of  adjustment 
costs may  sometimes  fall on the smaller and weaker economies. This highlights the 
critical importance of compensation mechanisms for sustaining the process of regional 
integration, especially when member states are at starkly different levels of income and 
development. 
 
2.2  Institutionalist View 
 
Institutionalist  explanations  are  premised  on  the  view  that  interdependence  among 
nations is so complex and overwhelming that it is beyond the capabilities of any single 
nation to solve its external problems by itself. Thus, there is a need to create regional 
and  global  institutions  that  can  effectively  deal  with  international  economic  and  non-
economic  problems  facing  nation  states  by  resolving  the  collective  action  problem. 
Moreover,  such  institutions  can  also  supply  technical  expertise  to  solve  problems  in 
identified issue areas. These considerations encourage states to cooperate and form 
institutions  to  meet  specific  functional  needs.  Further,  when  member  states  begin  to 
receive benefits of efficiency and expertise from an institution in one issue area, they 
become  willing  to  create  similar  institutions  to  deal  with  problems  in  other  areas. 
Beneficiary interest groups, political and civil society groups, and outsiders with vested 
interest  (e.g.,  multinational  corporations,  global  institutions,  and  foreign  powers) 
contribute to articulating the demand for new institutions. Spillovers of this kind lead to 
the development of multiple institutions to manage problems in different issue areas. The 
spread  of  functional  institutions  across  different  issue  areas  creates  cross  sectoral 
linkages and promotes economic integration among member states, laying a foundation 
for their eventual political union as well. 
 
While the institutionalist view demonstrates the need for regional and global institutions 
and the important role these now play in global economic and non-economic spheres, it 
has also been criticized on various grounds. The main criticism is that institutionalists do 
not adequately appreciate the role of politics in the decision-making processes of nation 
states. Institutionalists seem to assume that decision-makers in member states are free 
to select and pursue the best technical solutions to the problems they face. Such an 
assumption effectively limits the power and function of decision-makers to selecting one 
of the technocratic solutions offered by functional institutions. In reality, however, several 
considerations—such  as  preferences  of  the  public  (voters);  pressures  from  political 
parties, business, and other interest groups, including the military and  the bureaucracy; 
and pressures from external allies—need to be taken into account in making decisions. 
This  requires  decision-makers  to  weigh  different  considerations  and  reconcile  the 
conflicts  and  tensions  among  them,  garner  requisite  support  from  relevant 
constituencies, and calibrate decisions to address the problem under consideration. This 
requires  national  decision-makers  to  go  far  beyond  any  given  menu  of  technocratic 
solutions  and  exercise  political  judgment  and  leadership.  For  this  reason,  the  nation 
states and their political systems and processes continue to hold decisive influence on 
the pace and direction of regionalism (Dash, 2008). 
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Dougherty and Pfaltzcraff (1990) put this point in a broader perspective by noting that ―it 
is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  separate  economic  and  social  tasks  from  the 
political…that  certain  economic  and  social  tasks  do  not  ramify  or  ‗spill-over‘  into  the 
political sector; and that the road to political integration lies through ‗acts of political will‘ 
rather  than  functional  integration  in  economic  and  social  sectors.‖  The  centrality  of 
political factors to decision-making in regionalism was also confirmed by the European 
experience  with  the  integration  process.  A  study  of  the  early  years  of  European 
integration (Pentland, 1973) concluded that political considerations weighted heavily in 
the decision-making process and that ―there was little or nothing that was ‗non-political‘ 
in the integration experience of Western Europe.‖ 
 
Theoretical explanations of why nations cooperate, as outlined above, do not provide a 
complete  framework  to  explain  why  regionalism  occurs.  They  also  seem  to  offer 
dissimilar  sets  of  objectives  that  individual  RCAs  choose  to  pursue.  Power-centric 
explanations  accord  primacy  to  security-related  objectives,  while  the  institutionalists 
focus  on  trade  and  economic  integration  objectives.  While  a  large majority of  recent 
RCAs are driven more by economic objectives, there is evidence that security-related 
objectives also enjoy high priority in several RCAs. The two sets of explanations have 
thus identified important forces that underlie regionalism and influence the performance 
of RCAs. The identified forces include the (i) power balance among nation states, (ii) role 
of domestic considerations in national decision-making, and (iii) objectives of an RCA. 




3.  Forces Underlying RCAs 
 
3.1  Power Balance 
 
The  relative  size  (area  and  population),  gross  domestic  product  (GDP),  and  military 
might  of  nation  states  generally  reflect  the  distribution  of  power  among  them.  The 
relationships among the member states of an RCA, level of mutual trust and cohesion, 
ease  of  negotiating,  and  willingness  to  compromise  and  reach  agreements  are 
influenced by the underlying balance of power among them. When member states are 
broadly comparable in size and military strength, their relative power is balanced and 
concerns about security and domination from one another are moderated.   
 
Yet,  in  several  instances  RCAs  have  satisfactorily  functioned  even  with  a  noticeable 
power  imbalance  among  members.  In  such  situations,  smaller  member  states  tacitly 
recognize  the  pre-eminent  position  of  the  powerful  member  in  exchange  for  its 
commitment  to  non-interference  and  peaceful  resolution  of  bilateral  and  regional 
problems.  In  fact,  when  such  understanding  exists,  the  powerful  member  can  bring 
coherence to regional security and other agenda items, and may act as a pivotal state 
providing  leadership  within  the  RCA.  Moreover,  the  smaller  states  are  able  to  draw 
comfort from having a stronger and larger fellow member that enhances their collective 
strength in dealing with the rest of the world. West Germany and Indonesia for instance, 
played such a role, respectively, in the European Economic Community/EU and ASEAN.  
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On the other hand, whenever a powerful member‘s primacy is disputed or its legitimacy 
challenged, it enhances disharmony in the RCA. The smaller states may aggravate the 
situation  by  countervailing  its  power  and  restricting  trade  and  economic  exchanges 
(Ayoob, 1995). 
 
When  the  power  balance  among  members  is  highly  asymmetric,  anxiety  about  the 
hegemonic designs of the most powerful member state is felt by other member states. 
Such concerns are considered inherent to the ―large neighbor–small neighbor‖ dynamic 
and are calibrated at high or low levels depending on the history of experiences between 
the sets of states. If there is a substantial trust deficit among members vis-à-vis the most 
powerful state, the former will resort to involving extra-regional players in their security 
arrangements to countervail the influence of the latter. Such arrangements are resented 
by the powerful state, especially when these appear to adversely affect its own security. 
This leads to the development of a security complex in the region in which the two sets 
of states keep on enhancing their respective security in an action–reaction sequence. 
 
Given  the  finding  of  power-centrists  that  states  are  unlikely  to  promote  trade  and 
cooperation with actual or potential adversary states, a highly-skewed power balance is 
likely  to  retard  the  progress  of  an  RCA. The  ineffectiveness  of  the  Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is attributed to the severe imbalance of 
power that exists between South Africa and the smaller member states of the SADCC.  
Similarly, a highly skewed power balance between India and other member states has 
been a major constraint on the performance of SAARC since its inception. 
 
Apart from concerns on security aspects, smaller members also worry about economic 
domination  by  the  larger  economy  of  the  powerful  state  because  economic  power 
usually  translates  into  wider  systemic  or  hegemonic  influence.  Fears  of 
deindustrialization are raised effectively by industries likely to be affected by increased 
trade with a dominant economy that may be more diversified while possessing scale 
advantage  in  several  industries.
3  Moreover,  the  losing  industries  are  usually  able  to 
mobilize public support for protection by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Concerns of 
economic  domination  are  aggravated  if  the  larger  economy  also  happens  to  be  the 
relatively more developed one. In such instances, it would likely have more capital to 
invest  in  smaller  member  economies,  stoking  fears  of  a  takeover  of  the  smaller 
economies by the dominant economy. To prevent this, businesses that are likely to lose 
from  trade  liberalization  can  mobilize  public  opinion  to  slow  the  pace  of  cooperation 
among member economies.  
 
At another level, governments in smaller economies themselves are likely to be wary of 
deepening  integration  since  it  eventually  boils  down  to  integration  with  the  dominant 
economy (Kelegama, 2008). To moderate the risk of overdependence, governments may 
also  attempt  to  restrict  trade  and  investment  with  the  dominant  economy  through 
adoption of nontrade barriers (NTBs) and dilatory practices, as well as by encouraging 
alternative  sources  of  imports  even  at  considerable  disadvantage  to  themselves 
(IDRC, 2008). 
                                            
3   Mercosur members, particularly Paraguay, complain of deindustrialization being caused by Brazil‘s 
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Most  member  states  of  ASEAN  are  small-  to  medium-sized,  with  the  largest  state, 
Indonesia, accounting for about two-fifth of ASEAN‘s population and a  one third of its 
GDP. As such, the power balance among them is not too skewed, although Indonesia 
does possess considerable military prowess vis-à-vis its neighbors. Despite Indonesia‘s 
record  of  having  aggressively  deployed  force  against  another  state  in  the  region, 
Malaysia, Southeast Asian states found it possible to continue working with Indonesia 
and  accord  it  the  recognition  its  size  and  power  commanded  in  the  region.  Three 
considerations probably contributed to this outcome:  
 
(i)   Regime change in Indonesia allowed the new regime to end conflict with 
Malaysia, claim credit for dismantling the earlier aggressor regime, and 
seek legitimacy by making a fresh start. 
(ii)  Being small- to medium-sized countries, ASEAN‘s other member states 
realized  that  a  friendly  Indonesia  would  substantially  add  to  their 
collective strength in standing up to the perceived external threat from 
communism.  
(iii)  Lastly, being opposed to communism, there was no acceptable alternative 
power for Southeast countries to turn to other than the US, which was 
already working with Indonesia at that time.  
 
In addition to the factors listed above, ASEAN‘s founding fathers showed remarkable 
vision  and  maturity  in  setting  aside  their  ongoing  disputes  and  pushing  ahead  with 
regional cooperation. 
 
3.2  National Decision-Making 
 
The major theoretical explanations of regionalism based on the assumption of either the 
unitary state as decision-maker (power-centric view) or technocratic solutions being the 
main basis of decision-making are seriously flawed in one major respect: a state is not 
unitary but comprises several constituents that influence the decision-making process. 
Accordingly,  national  decision-makers  cannot  make  decisions  based  mainly  on 
technocratic considerations, but rather need to accommodate the policy preferences of 
several constituents. Thus, the main flaw in both sets of explanations is that they fail to 
understand  the  critical  role  played  by  the  political  actors  and  societal  groups  in  the 
process of national decision-making. 
 
In most states, the decision-making authority to enter negotiations and accept or reject 
international  and  regional  agreements  rests  with  the  executive  head  of  government. 
However, the power of such decision-makers is not absolute since the executive has to 
depend on the bureaucracy for inputs and advice in policymaking and negotiations, and, 
subsequently, for execution. If the state‘s bureaucracy is not supportive, it can effectively 
frustrate  an  executive‘s  policies.  The  executive,  therefore,  needs  to  win  the 
bureaucracy‘s  support  by  showing  some  receptivity  to  its  views.  Likewise,  since  a 
negotiated  regional  agreement  may  need  to  be  ratified  in  a  country‘s  legislature,  a 
decision-maker  is  required  to  accommodate  the  policy  preferences  and  interests  of 
legislators to the extent necessary to win their support for ratification. Even when formal 
ratification is not needed, the decision-maker as well as legislators have to be sensitive  
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to the reactions of various societal groups for two reasons. First, they depend on the 
support (votes) of societal groups to get elected. If there is widespread unhappiness 
among societal groups about any agreement, it may translate into a loss of votes and 
perhaps  power  for  the  political  players  concerned.  Moreover,  the  implementation  of 
unpopular  agreements  can  become  problematic,  if  not  impossible,  and  cause 
embarrassment to decision-makers. 
 
3.2.1  Constituencies 
 
Decision-makers and legislators need to be sensitive to the views of special interests, 
especially  big  business,  since  their  help  is  needed  for  funding  political  activities  and 
maintaining  a  healthy economy.  In  a  non-democratic  state,  decision-makers  may  not 
have to depend on the support of societal groups to remain in power and can show 
indifference to their policy preferences. However, even in such systems, the decision-
maker needs the support of key constituencies such as the military, bureaucracy, big 
business, and opinion-makers. 
 
Decision-making  in  domestic  policies  is  thus  dispersed.  Every  societal  segment  may 
have  a  stake  in  the  decision.  Hence,  accommodation  of  their  views  and  interests  is 
important for the success of domestic policy. The concept of a unitary state defining what 
constitutes its national interests and making decisions by itself is, therefore, not tenable, 
nor  is  that  of  decisions  being  guided  mainly  by  technocratic  options.  Several 
stakeholders  exercise  influence  and  power  over  national  decision-making,  effectively 
bringing  an  international  policy  agenda  within  the  ambit  of  the  domestic  struggle  for 
power and the search for internal compromise (Milner, 1997). 
 
The extent of influence exercised by different stakeholders on decision-making depends 
on the respective strengths of the decision-maker (executive), legislators, and different 
societal groups including the general public, businesses, professionals, and labor and 
religious leaders. A governments based on broad-based public support and having a 
stable majority in the legislature, as well as an individual leader enjoying a high level of 
personal  popularity,  can  exercise  greater  control  over  decision-making  as  they  are 
confident of garnering adequate support from societal groups. Confident governments 
and  decision-makers  may  also  use  RCAs  as  a  ―commitment  mechanism‖  to  lock-in 
certain  policies—on  foreign  direct  investment,  for  example—to  safeguard  these  from 
future backlash and assure foreign investors of policy continuity. Weak governments on 
the other hand are likely to be much more accommodative of societal groups‘ concerns 
and  generally  remain  passive  about  promoting  regional  cooperation  unless  it  is 
specifically demanded by the latter. 
 
3.2.2  Government’s Role 
 
For regional cooperation to progress, governments need to proactively promote it since 
there is little revealed demand for it. Except in situations involving urgent issues of intra-
regional  and/or  external  security,  or  where  the  negative  externalities  of  neighboring 
states  pose  immediate  concerns  (e.g.  acid  rain,  haze),  the  pursuit  of  regional 
cooperation does not appear to be a pressing matter for most governments. In fact, 
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for negative reactions from some domestic constituencies, governments often tend to 
adopt  an  unhurried  approach  to  its  pursuit.  However,  for  regional  cooperation  to 
progress,  governments  need  to  initiate  an  agenda  and  negotiate  over  it  with  fellow 
member governments on the one hand, and with domestic constituencies on the other. 
Hence,  when  member  governments  are  weak  and  passive,  regional  cooperation  is 
unlikely to make much progress.  
 
3.2.3  Special Interests 
 
Among different societal groups, the better resourced and organized groups such as 
industry  and  business  associations,  labor  unions,  and  religious  and  social  activists 
usually exercise considerable influence over decision-making in their respective areas of 
interest.  Usually,  industries  and  businesses  receiving  tariff  protection  and  the  labor 
unions associated with them oppose trade and investment liberalization under RCAs. 
However,  sections  of  industries  and  businesses  that  stand  to  benefit  from  such 
measures  become  champions  of  such  policies.  Industries  with  the  scope  to  capture 
increasing returns to scale, in particular, often proactively lobby for trade liberalization to 
access  new  markets  and  scale  up  their  operations.  Notwithstanding  such  internal 
differences,  business  groups  wield  considerable  power  over  decision-making.  For 
instance,  sustained  pressure  from  business  groups  successfully  pushed  for  the  re-
launching of European integration in the mid-1980s. Similarly, business interests in North 
America and Mexico heavily lobbied for the creation of NAFTA in the mid-1990s. Some 
studies also show that several provisions in NAFTA were designed specifically to protect 
the concerns of sections of the US automobile and textiles industries. 
 
3.2.4  Strategic Policy Groups 
 
Influence on the establishment and/or adoption of RCAs is also exerted by strategic and 
security  policy  groups  comprising  experts  in  relevant  disciplines  and  former  senior 
members of the military and intelligence community, and foreign service establishments. 
These  groups  exercise  significant  influence  in  decision-making  through  their  domain 
expertise, contacts in the government, and role as opinion- makers in the public space. 
To  the  extent  that  members  of  such  groups  tend  to  be  inherently  overcautious  in 
approach,  they  often  support  the  status  quo  and  resist  initiatives  to  re-examine 
established paradigms of relationships with other member states. 
 
3.2.5  Public Opinion 
 
The general public does not often exercise visible influence over decision-making on 
international or regional issues since these often appear complex and somewhat remote 
from  the  public‘s  day-to-day  concerns.  Some  scholars,  however,  make  an  important 
distinction between public attitudes to international policy issues versus regional ones, 
observing that the general public is more engaged with regional policy issues (Dash, 
2008).  This  is  because  unlike  the  case  with  international  policy  issues,  regional 
cooperation can have pronounced implications  on a nation‘s domestic arrangements. 
For instance, the free movement of goods and people across borders, joint projects, and 
cooperative security arrangements can have implications for the distribution and use of 
internal resources affecting the daily life of sections of the general public. (Admittedly,  
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similar observation can be made about international policy issues, but with very limited 
salience.) 
 
Another channel through which the general public is connected with regional issues is 
through its attitudes toward the country‘s neighbors. Most countries have a long history 
of  co-existing  with  neighboring  states  comprising  traditional  trade  and  exchange; 
common ethnic bonds, especially near respective border areas; and similar cultural and 
linguistic traditions. Such history might also include disputes and conflicts over borders, 
common  rivers,  and  other  matters.  Because  of  geographic  proximity,  travel,  and 
accumulated  historical  experience,  citizens  of  a  particular  country  usually  receive 
considerably more information about its neighboring countries than about most others in 
the  world.  Through  such  information,  folklore,  hearsay,  and  in  some  cases  personal 
experience, nationals of a country come to form their perceptions and attitudes about 
neighboring states. 
 
The public‘s perceptions about a partner state/s regarding (i) motives towards their own 
country, (ii) trustworthiness, (iii)  economic and military capacity, and (iv) international 
credibility become important in developing the public‘s attitude toward cooperation with 
the  partner  state/s.  If  perceptions  are  negative,  the  public‘s  attitude  will  be  one  of 
unfriendliness, if not hostility, towards the state/s concerned and the public will likely be 
unenthusiastic about proposals involving the subject state/s as a matter of precaution. 
Ominously, however, passively negative public attitudes towards partner state/s can be 
stirred up through disinformation and chauvinistic appeals from special interest groups. 
As  a  result,  interest  groups  can  use  such  public  hostility  to  oppose  specific  RCA 
proposals  for  their  own  reasons.  In  this  process,  the  passively  negative  public 
perceptions and attitudes are gradually turned into an issue-blind, permanent barrier to 
progress  on  cooperation  with  the concerned  partner  state/s.  Even  a  determined  and 
powerful decision-maker may have to expend considerable energy and political capital to 
persuade the public to re-examine its attitudes and support RCA proposals under such 
conditions.  
 
Which policies a decision-maker will ultimately pursue in the regional and international 
arena will be determined by a state‘s political system; bureaucracy; different societal 
groups, including special interests; opinion-makers; and public attitudes. 
 
3.3  Objectives of RCAs 
 
The expansion of trade and economic exchanges, and deeper integration with member 
economies have been dominant objectives of most RCAs, especially since the 1980s. 
Besides these economic objectives, important non-economic objectives are often also 
pursued by member states through RCAs, including 
 
(i)   countering common external threats to security, 
(ii)   minimizing  interstate  conflicts  and  building  stability  and  peace  in  the 
region, and 
(iii)   harvesting opportunities and managing issues in the region that require 
collaboration between two or more states. 
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3.3.1  External Security Threats 
 
Countering  external  security  threats  has  been  an  important  motivation  behind  the 
creation of several RCAs. The threat may be perceived in terms of territorial, ideological, 
or  political  dominance.  The  member  states  may  come  together  to  leverage  their 
collective strength against a perceived common threat in any form. While member states 
may be individually too small and feeble to counter the threat, collectively they may be in 
better position to respond. Expectedly, the motivation to minimize ongoing differences 
and  disputes  among  the  member  states  themselves,  and  their  willingness  to  work 
together against the external threat will correspond to a threat‘s gravity. For instance, 
fear of the growing power of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after the Second World 
War was among the considerations that pushed Western European nations to work with 
their former adversaries, (West) Germany and Italy. Likewise, concerns over the growing 
power  and  influence  of  the  People‘s  Republic  of  China  (PRC),  prompted  Southeast 
Asian states to form ASEAN and embrace Indonesia into their fold, despite the latter‘s 
aggressive behavior in the recent past. There are a number of other instances in which 
an external security threat contributed to the formation of an RCA. Fear of the powerful 
apartheid regime in South Africa led to the creation of the Southern African Development 
Cooperation Conference (SADCC), South American concerns over US hegemony led to 
Mercosur, and fear of Iran and Iraq among the smaller Persian Gulf states led to the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (IDRC, 2008). External threat perception seems to act as glue to 
bring (and hold) together even hostile and recalcitrant neighboring states, and can be 
seen as a positive force for regional cooperation. Contrarily, it seems likely that in its 
absence, member states may tend to magnify rather than moderate their bilateral and 
plurilateral differences, which may act to stunt regional cooperation. 
 
3.3.2  Regional Stability and Peace 
 
Another  important  security-related  objective  that  states  pursue  through  regional 
cooperation is the build-up of stability and peace in the region. Apart from the obvious 
value of conflict-free relations with neighbors and reduced defense expenditure, regional 
stability  and  peace  is  a  key  requirement  for  attracting  foreign  and  local  investment 
(Wanandi, 2001). Regional peace is likewise critical if the region is confronted by an 
external security threat. While regional stability and peace are highly desirable, nation 
states  are  often  at  odds  with  their  neighbors.  This  is  because  nation  states,  almost 
always have ongoing differences with neighbors regarding land and maritime borders, 
ownership of resources straddling these borders, and the (illegal) entry of goods and 
humans, among other issues. Mutual suspicion about each other‘s territorial ambitions is 
also not uncommon among neighbors. Moreover, internal problems and instability in one 
state usually tend to spill over into a neighboring state/s, especially when  there is a 
sympathetic ethnic group in its own population. 
 
Many such events often cause serious tensions among neighbors  on account of the 
politics  of  the  moment,  miscommunication,  and  misunderstandings;  threatening  to 
explode into open conflict if allowed to fester unchecked. However, in cases where an 
RCA  provides  informal  channels  of  communications  and  opportunities  for  frequent 
contacts among neighbors, the possibilities increase for diffusing such tensions before 
they escalate excessively. This is because the RCA framework fosters more free and  
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frequent  communication  among  members,  and  contributes  to  improved  interpersonal 
contacts  and the gradual building of  trust among members. This helps in minimizing 
misunderstandings and miscommunication, and enhances appreciation of each other‘s 
positions. In addition, this encourages more understanding and patience on the part of 
all parties, thereby improving chances for the diffusion of tensions should they arise. 
Even when such matters may be bilateral and hence formally excluded from the scope 
of an RCA, contending states remain conscious of the fact that their actions are subject 
to the informal scrutiny and quiet judgment of their peers. 
 
The objective of building regional stability and peace has provided strong motivation for 
the formation of several RCAs. One of the oldest and most successful RCAs—the EU—
was  initiated  with  the  primary  objective  of  securing  peace  and  stability  in  Europe 
following the devastation suffered during the Second World War. The EU was borne of 
the  notion  that  the  possibility  of  future  conflicts  among  European  nations  could  be 
minimized if they worked together to build a unified community of European states. The 
quest for regional stability and peace was so compelling that they agreed to put aside 
the  enmities  and  bitterness  of  their  recent  experiences.  In  addition,  the  perceived 
security  threat  from  the  growing  power  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  Eastern  Europe  also 
exerted pressure on them to cooperate. 
 
Establishment  of  ASEAN  was  likewise  prompted  by  member  states‘  desire  to  avoid 
potential inter-state conflicts among them, especially as they perceived a threat to their 
security from the growing influence and power in the region of the PRC. In the mid-
1960s when ASEAN was formed, Southeast Asia was a seriously troubled region that 
prompted observers to call it the ―Balkans of Asia‖ (Wanandi, 2001). Every Southeast 
Asian country was fighting an insurgency and mired in economic problems and ethnic 
tensions that had the potential to spill across borders and fuel interstate feuds. Thailand, 
for  example,  was  a  reluctant  host  to  a  flood  of  refugees  and  other  fallout  from  the 
ongoing conflicts in Cambodia, the Lao People‘s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and 
Viet  Nam;  Malaysia  and  Singapore  had  just  endured  an  acrimonious  separation; 
Malaysia and Philippines were threatening each other over competing claims to Sabah 
on the island of Borneo; and Indonesia had taken up arms in the ―Konfrontasi‖ to subdue 
Malaysia.    Although  the  Konfrontasi  fortuitously  ended  with  the  fall  of  Soekarno  in 
Indonesia, it had shown the potential of what could happen in the region. All of these 
developments  contributed  to  uncertainty  and  serious  concern  among  the  states  of 
Southeast Asia about their individual and collective security. 
 
The combination of the potential for continued inter-state conflicts within ASEAN and the 
perception of growing external security threats persuaded the subject states to put aside 
their ongoing disputes with one another and urgently forge a unified regional entity. This 
entity would seek to avoid inter-state conflicts by resolving disputes through peaceful 
dialogue and consultations among members, while also demonstrating their solidarity 
against any threats to the region from external sources. Moreover, perhaps there was 
also  recognition  in  the  region  that,  Indonesia  needed  to  maintain  a  certain  level  of 
military might for safeguarding its territorial integrity. To do so without causing undue 
concerns among its neighbors, it was desirable to engage Indonesia in a cooperative 
network. Such arrangements enhance mutual interactions and the flow of information for 
developing  relationships  of  understanding  and  trust  in  the  region.  The  formation  of The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia  |       13 
 
 
ASEAN was thus prompted mainly to minimize the prospects of inter-state conflicts and 
achieve stability and peace across the region. 
 
The formation of the GMS RCA was also prompted primarily by the goal of developing 
peaceful  relations  among  the  formerly  adversarial  countries  of  Indochina.  Given  the 
extreme asymmetry of power and economic development among them, and their history 
of  frequent  conflicts,  continued  instability  was  likely  to  characterize  the  sub-region, 
jeopardizing the welfare of the people in the GMS as well as Asia as a whole. To avoid 
such an outcome, the donor community, headed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
encouraged the concerned countries to work together for regional stability and peace. 
 
Several  other  RCAs  were  likewise  established  primarily  for  preventing  inter-state 
conflicts  and  promoting  peace  in  their  respective  region  (IDRC,  2008).  For  instance, 
Mercosur  was  formed  to  reduce  frequent  tensions  between  two  large  neighbors: 
Argentina and Brazil. Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia signed an agreement with the EU as 
a means to contain the threatened spread of religious fundamentalism. The US signed a 
trade protocol with Egypt and Israel to accelerate rapprochement between them. Under 
the protocol, the US offered easy access to its markets for the products of their joint 
ventures. Building stability and peace in a region has thus been an important goal for 
many RCAs. 
 
3.3.3  Regional Opportunities and Issues 
 
Harvesting opportunities and addressing issues in the region that require two or more 
states to collaborate is an important objective in most, if not all, RCAs. Opportunities 
exist in the form of coordinated and joint development of resources such as rivers and 
bodies of water that straddle more than one state, and protecting regional ecosystems 
that  can  be  best  managed  through  cooperative  approach.  In  an  increasingly 
interconnected  world,  where  norms  and  rules  for  global  and  national  governance  in 
critical areas (e.g. trade and capital flows, intellectual property rights, climate change, 
global  financial  architecture)  evolve  through  negotiations  among  groups  of  nations, 
member states of an RCA are more likely to have their voices heard collectively rather 
than as individual states. As in the case of ASEAN, ―regional cooperation allowed the 
group  of  small  and  medium  powers  to  unite  and  engage  more  powerful  states  and 
economies than  would  have  been  possible for  10  small  states  individually‖  (Tay  and 
Estanislao, 2001). 
 
In addition, there are additional regional issues that require two or more (and sometimes 
all) RCA member states working together for their effective management. These issues 
include  controlling  cross-border  terrorism;  halting  trafficking  in  drugs,  weapons,  and 
humans; preventing the spread of infectious diseases; and mitigating the effects of acid 
rain, haze, and other pollutants. Mercosur, for instance, has the explicit goal of providing 
a platform for its members to discuss common security issues such as drug trafficking. 
The  management  of  these  issues  through  regional  cooperation  has  the  potential  to 
enhance regional and global welfare. While such opportunities have not yet adequately 
engaged  the  attention  of  member  states  of  several  RCAs,  they  should  gain  greater 
attention and priority in the future. 
  
14          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 54 
3.3.4  Need for a Comprehensive Approach 
 
The foregoing discussion shows that important structural characteristics, such as the 
role  of  the  state  and  societal  groups  in  national  decision-making,  inter-state  power 
relationships, and the priority objectives being pursued, differ among RCAs. As such, all 
RCAs are not alike and they differ from one another in terms of built-in strengths and 
constraints inherited from their unique characteristics. Much of the ongoing debate over 
regionalism,  however,  treats  RCAs  mainly  as  instruments  of  economic  forces  and 
processes, built to achieve the single goal of economic integration. Yet, for example, the 
EU  was  founded  for  the  purpose  of  minimizing  inter-state  conflicts  in  Europe,  while 
economic  cooperation  was  used  as  a  tool  for  achieving  it.  Likewise,  ASEAN  was 
established  for  strengthening  the  internal  stability  and  external  security  of  Southeast 
Asia, and it only began to seriously pursue economic cooperation 25 years after coming 
into existence. 
 
The  approach  that  pays  inadequate  attention  to  the  non-economic  characteristics  of 
RCAs results in incomplete assessments and comparisons of their performances. For 
instance, ASEAN was established to achieve peace and stability in the region, in which it 
succeeded  remarkably  well.  However,  when  it  attracted  criticism  for  not  making 
significant achievements in economic and environmental areas, then Secretary General 
of ASEAN, Rodolfo Severino pointed out in 1998 that the performance of an RCA should 
relate to its own characteristics and objectives and that ―we must first of all be clear 
about what ASEAN is and what it is not, what it can and what it cannot or was not meant 
to do….The important thing is that ASEAN has to be measured against  the purposes 
that it has set for itself and the limitations it has imposed on itself. ‖ In a similar manner, 
Estanislao and Tay (2001) reject such criticism by explaining that ―critics misunderstand 
the intentions and self-imposed limits of ASEAN. ASEAN never functioned in any way 
other  than  a  ‗soft‘  association,  and  it  was  wrong  to  expect  it  to  have  behaved  as  a 
‗strong‘ union even in crises. ASEAN was never meant to evolve in the way the EU did. 
Norms of non-interference and aversion of strong bureaucracy meant that ASEAN is 
more an association than an institution.‖ 
 
More importantly, a narrow approach to RCA assessment also risks not being able to 
recognize  valuable  achievements  and  opportunities  for  cooperation  in  non-economic 
spheres that sometimes might be the only realizable ones under conditions of a given 
RCA. For instance, ASEAN made significant contributions to the sustained high growth 
of  member  economies  through  maintaining  peace  and  stability  in  the  region,  and  in 
attracting FDI and global production networks. However, such contributions have often 
remained underappreciated. Likewise, SAARC‘s role in providing a valuable (and sole) 
platform  for  informal  high-level  contacts  among  South  Asian  decision-makers  and, 
thereby,  helping  to  reduce  tensions  among  them  also  deserves  due  recognition.  By 
concentrating  too  heavily  on  economic  objectives,  inadequate  attention  is  given  to 
conceptualization and encouragement of other forms of regional cooperation of a less 
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4.  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation  
 
4.1  Background 
 
SAARC,  which  was  established  in  1985,  has  now  been  in  existence  for  a  quarter 
century.  SAARC  is  characterized  by  India‘s  centrality  to  the  region  and  the  extreme 
asymmetry  of  power  balance  among  member  states.  India  accounts  for  75%  of 
SAARC‘s population and nearly 80% of GDP, while the next largest SAARC member 
state accounts for about 11% of each. India also holds an overwhelming advantage in 
military power over all other SAARC members combined. India shares borders with all 
other member states (except Afghanistan and  the  Maldives), while no other member 
(except  Pakistan)  shares  a  border  with  any  country  other  than  India.  Two  member 
states, Nepal and Bhutan, are land-locked and depend on India for transit to the outside 
world. Another member, Bangladesh, has direct access to international seas from one 
side but is surrounded by India on all other sides. There are also unresolved bilateral 
disputes among members that mostly involve India. The combination of these structural 
features generates security concerns and domination fears  in other SAARC  member 
states. 
 
Concerns are  also aggravated by the recent historical experience of the region. The 
partition of India on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory created a deep ideological divide 
between the two largest nations in the region: secular India and an Islamic Pakistan. The 
Kashmir issue became a test of the respective creeds of the two countries. Pakistan 
feared that if a Muslim majority province could remain a part of India, then the very 
raison d’etre of Pakistan would collapse, eventually leading to the collapse of Pakistan 
itself  (Bhutto,  1969).  India,  on  the  other  hand,  feared  that  giving  up  Kashmir  would 
undercut  its  secular  construct  and  promote  separatists  tendencies.  In  the  past 
6 decades, the two countries have fought three wars over Kashmir, while a low-level 
insurgency has persisted more or less throughout this period. With such history between 
them, many in Pakistan consider India as not only a threat to its security but to its very 
existence as well. 
 
The security concerns of other smaller states vis-à-vis India are perhaps less intense but 
equally serious. At least two of these states (Bangladesh and Nepal) also worry about 
economic  domination  by  India.  Bangladesh,  which  was  formerly  the  eastern  part  of 
Bengal in colonial India, had a longstanding dependency on the western part of Bengal, 
which was to remain in India after independence. This led to the exploitation of eastern 
Bengal,  which  largely  comprised  poor  Muslim  farmers  and  tenants,  by  the  primarily 
Hindu  landlords  and  merchants  of  western  Bengal.  This  history  is  still  bitterly 
remembered in Bangladesh (Sobhan, 1991).  
 
Nepal, being effectively land-locked, is nearly wholly dependent on India for transit to the 
outside world as well as for much of its essential imports. Such dependency gives India 
considerable  leverage  over  Nepal  in  all  areas  of  its  life,  which  puts  Nepal  at  a 
disadvantage in dealing with its far larger neighbor. Because of their geography and lack 
of economic development, a certain degree of dependence on India seems unavoidable 
for both Bangladesh and Nepal. However, these circumstances also heighten their fears  
16          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 54 
about dependence on India and possible domination. Other smaller states within SAARC 
share similar concerns, although perhaps in smaller measure.   
 
Consequently, India is perceived as a threat and potential (or actual) adversary by most 
states in South Asia, and SAARC member countries‘ inter-state relations with India are 
generally fraught with distrust and apprehension, and even latent (or overt) hostility. 
 
Against  the  backdrop  of  such  regional  dynamics,  the  proposal  for  an  RCA  was  first 
mooted by Bangladesh on the grounds of achieving peace, stability, and security in the 
region.  The  proposal  was  thus  likely  aimed  more  at  achieving  regional  stability  and 
peace,  and  improved  inter-state  relations,  than  promotion  of  trade  among  member 
economies. In the 1970s, when efforts to launch an RCA were initiated, South Asian 
nations were committed to the goal of self-sufficiency through import substitution. Hence, 
trade was probably not very high on their agenda. More likely, the region‘s smaller states 
wanted a bulwark against the threat of real or perceived dominance by India more than 
they sought access to markets in India and Pakistan. 
 
The  RCA  proposal  received    enthusiastic  support  from  all  states  except  India  and 
Pakistan,  which    feared  that  any  regional  arrangements  might  restrict  their  policy 
autonomy. However, both finally agreed to join on the condition that security issues and 
bilateral matters would be excluded from the scope of the RCA.  
 
Therefore, while security concerns and fear of dominance by India were acutely felt in 
South Asia at the time of SAARC‘s establishment, both of these had to be excluded from 
the  SAARC  framework  in  order  to  win  agreement  from  India  and  Pakistan.  Such 
exclusions  rendered  SAARC  incapable  of  addressing  issues  that  were  urgent  and 
important  to  most  member  states,  and  confined  it  to  focus  on  trade  and  economic 
cooperation, which was not the immediate priority of its members.   
 
While the issues of security and Indian domination disappeared from SAARC‘s agenda, 
they did not disappear from the real world and, in fact, spawned conditions that severely 
restricted cooperation in the region. Security concerns about India did not abate as India 
was not able to engender enough confidence and trust among its neighbors about its 
commitment  to  non-interference  and  peaceful  resolution  of  bilateral  disputes.  On  the 
contrary, several events exacerbated  such concerns over the years, including India‘s 
posture towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) movement in Sri Lanka, its 
perceived interference in political developments in Nepal, and continued stalemate over 
several bilateral issues. To the extent that member states continued to see India as a 
threat and possible adversary, there was little incentive for them to cooperate on other 
issues as long as their security concerns remained unresolved.   
 
Moreover, as a consequence of their continuing  concerns,  several SAARC members 
concluded security arrangements with extra-regional powers that were eager to insert 
themselves in South Asia. Member states also began to externalize their bilateral issues 
with  India.  Since  India  considered  such  externalization  to  adversely  affect  its  own 
security, mutual distrust and tension among members continued to escalate. Involving 
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also diluted member states‘ commitment to SAARC and impeded its potential evolution 
into an effective regional entity.    
 
Disharmony and a lack of consensus on India‘s primacy and leadership role in the region 
meant  that  there  was  no  ―focal  state‖  to  facilitate  the  coordination  of  policies  and 
activities  among  members.
4  While  the  presence  of  a  focal  state  is  seen  to  help  in 
resolving coordination problems and providing momentum to an RCA, its absence can 
create a ―coordination dilemma,‖ promote disharmony among members, and lead to an 
RCA‘s failure. Ayoob (1999) suggests that several RCAs including LAFTA, the Andean 
Pact, Caribbean Community, Arab Common Market, and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) were affected by the absence of leadership from a focal 
state.  
  
An unintended consequence of the absence of a focal state in SAARC was that there 
were no resources to compensate poorer states that were not in a position to bear the 
costs associated with trade liberalization. This created a degree of built-in reluctance 
among such states to support SAARC‘s agenda on trade liberalization. 
 
Yet another consequence of the failure to address the security and domination fears of 
smaller  states  in  the  region  was  that  inter-state  relations  between  India  and  several 
SAARC states continued to be marked by distrust and suspicion. Such an atmosphere 
reinforced and even further escalated negative public attitudes towards partner states in 
the region in general and between India and other states in particular. As noted earlier, 
negative  public  perceptions  of  partner  state/s  can  turn  into  an  issue-blind  barrier  to 
cooperation with them, as seems to happen from time to time within SAARC, particularly 
between India and other member states. A recent survey of public attitudes in SAARC 
member  countries  towards  fellow  member  states  and  the  RCA  itself  revealed 
considerable  negativity  towards  both,  suggesting  a  lack  of  strong  public  support  for 
regional cooperation (Dash, 2008). 
 
Since  India  and  Pakistan  view  each  other  as  adversaries,  neither  has  had  much 
incentive to trade with the other based on the view that nation states are disinclined to 
trade with present or potential adversaries. Studies of trade possibilities and barriers 
between  the  two  countries  confirm  that  India  and  Pakistan  limit  their  mutual  trade. 
Pakistan does not accord most-favored nation (MFN) status to India and reportedly also 
maintains a substantial negative list specific to Indian goods, thereby effectively banning 
or  crippling  potential  trade  between  the  two  countries.  India,  on  the  other  hand, 
effectively discriminates against Pakistani products through several NTBs. 
 
 
                                            
4   Interestingly,  the  European  and  the  Southeast  Asian  states  had  been  able  to  include  former 
aggressor states into their respective RCAs and accept their role as focal states in tacit recognition 
of their primacy in the region. However, this did not happen in South Asia even though India was 
only a perceived expansionist and not a proven aggressor. The difference is probably explained by 
the absence of a perception of an external threat among South Asian states. This absence has 
meant there is no pressure on SAARC member states to unite in the face of a common threat, which 
may have encouraged them to magnify, rather than moderate, their internal differences, thereby 
making compromises difficult if not impossible.  
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A study by the State Bank of Pakistan in 2005 found that 32% of the types of products 
exported by Pakistan were imported by India from countries other than Pakistan even 
though the unit price of Pakistani products was lower than that of the competing imports 
to India. Likewise, nearly 50% of India‘s export products were imported by Pakistan from 
countries  other than India even though the Indian  products were cheaper. The 2005 
study estimated that Pakistan was losing between US$400 million and US$900 million 
annually  by  obtaining  such  imports  from  alternative  sources. A  similar  study  in  India 
(Taneja, 2007) found that of the top 50 export items from Pakistan, India imported 45 of 
these items from the rest of the world, but not from Pakistan. A similar examination of 
India‘s top 50 export items showed that nearly two-thirds of these items were excluded 
by Pakistan from its ―positive‖ list of imports allowed from India, effectively preventing 
their import. It also found that while India‘s ―sensitive‖ products list was small, it included 
many textile products of high export interest to Pakistan, which slowed their import into 
India. Moreover, continuing neglect of infrastructure for overland trade by both countries 
reflects the collective lack of serious intent to promote mutual trade. As a result, only 
about 10% of the estimated trade potential between the two countries is considered to 
be presently realized. 
 
A  somewhat  comparable  situation  is  observed  with  regard  to  trade  and  cooperation 
between  India  and  Bangladesh,  and  India  and  Nepal. Although  an  MFN  agreement 
exists  between  itself  and  India,  Bangladesh  continues  to  maintain  a  restrictive  trade 
regime vis-à-vis India and—in defiance of trade logic—has sometimes refused to trade 
with India, even in commodities in which it possesses a comparative advantage (IDRC, 
2008). There is resistance to allowing greater trade with India on the part of Bangladesh, 
presumably because it would only further increase its dependence on India.  
 
Bangladesh‘s trade with India also results in large trade balance in India‘s favor. Studies 
by  the  Research  and  Information  System  for  Developing  Countries  (RIS)  in  2008 
showed  that  these  trade  imbalances  result  from  supply  constraints  in  Bangladesh‘s 
export industries. However, Bangladesh is reluctant to accept value-adding investments 
from  India  in  industries  of  import  interest  to  India.  Investment  proposals  for  the 
development of gas-based industries in Bangladesh from Indian corporates have been 
under discussion since 1975 without any agreement reached to date.   
 
Likewise, despite the FTA and an investment agreement between India and Nepal, and 
Nepal‘s  need  for  FDI,  it  has  shown  considerable  reluctance  to  accept  Indian 
investments.  Hydropower (potential capacity > 70,000 MW) is Nepal‘s major  resource 
and its development could become an important source of export revenue for Nepal. 
Moreover, energy-deficient India is potentially an eager buyer for the energy produced 
by Nepal. However, during the past several decades, capacity of less than 700 MW (or 
1% of its potential capacity) has been jointly developed by the two countries. 
 
On the other hand, following the signing of an FTA between India and Sri Lanka in 1999, 
there  has  been  considerable  expansion  in  trade  and  investment  between  the  two 
countries.   
 
Owing  to  fears  of  Indian  domination,  Bangladesh  and  Nepal  aim  to  restrict  their 
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(and investments) with India are held in check by imports from extra-regional suppliers, 
even at higher costs. Pakistan likewise restricts trade with India to limit the penetration of 
Indian products into its market and restrain the growth of mutuality and interdependence. 
Moreover, almost since independence, Pakistan‘s economic structure has been shaped 
by  the  objective  of  moving  away  from  its  historical  links  with  the  Indian  economy. 
Development of intensive trade and investment with India would require an economic re-
orientation, at least in certain sectors, which is bound to meet resistance from a section 
of population, as well as investors and companies operating in the affected sectors.  
 
The  underlying  reluctance  of  SAARC  member  states  to  allow  the  free  flow  of  trade 
among themselves is reflected in the very low level of intra-regional trade at about 5% of 
members‘ total trade. While studies confirm the huge potential for expansion of intra-
regional trade, there has been only a mild response from member countries in seeking to 
realize it. In fact, the business environment and infrastructure for trade and exchange 
within the region pose serious impediments to the growth of intra-regional trade. Private 
sector participants have identified several key impediments such as restrictive business 
visa  rules,  dysfunctional  land  customs  stations,  the  lack  of  regional  vehicular 
agreements,  and  unclear  and  vague  NTBs  (ADB,  2010a).  Actions  to  remedy  such 




5.  SAARC Performance and Prospects 
 
5.1  Performance 
 
According  to  Dubey  (2008),  ―If  political  differences  among  countries  can  be  ignored, 
South Asia offers several desirable features for regional cooperation. It is a contiguous 
land  mass,  with  several  rivers  crisscrossing  the  region.  The  region  has  a  common 
history, languages, and cultures, as well as common inherited legal and administrative 
systems. And over the last decade, all of the region‘s economies have been liberalizing 
and  generally  growing  at  respectable  rates,  which  should  further  facilitate  deeper 
cooperation  in  the  region.‖  However,  politics  continues  to  play  a  role  in  deeply 
constraining SAARC‘s performance.  
 
Within  a  few  years  of  its  establishment,  SAARC  launched  dozens  of  initiatives  for 
promoting regional cooperation in several priority areas, including region-level action on  
food security, poverty alleviation, the suppression of terrorism, energy development, and 
the environment. 
 
The  initiatives  also  aimed  at  creating  SAARC  Regional  Centers,  people-to-people 
contact programs, and a SAARC Development Fund. While some visible progress has 
been  made,  much  of  it  remains  on  paper  and  comprises  the  repeated  summit 
declarations  of  members‘  commitment  to  underlying  objectives.  Even  very  important 
regional  initiatives  such  as  poverty  alleviation,  food  security,  and  the  suppression  of 
terrorism have made little progress over the past 2 decades. As a result, ―none of the 
activities and initiatives has had any major direct impact on strengthening the regional 
cooperation  and  integration  process  in  South  Asia‖  (Mahendra,  2010).  Moreover,  
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SAARC‘s attempt to fast-track trade liberalization among members under a Preferential 
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) also failed to produce worthwhile growth in intra-regional 
trade. As a result, SAARC‘s achievements to date have remained very modest.   
 
Several factors have contributed to this sub-par performance in regional cooperation. 
The  constraining  influence  of  regional  politics  and  poor  inter-state  relations  among 
members have been the most important factors. Disharmony among member states and 
their fluctuating levels of commitment to SAARC has affected implementation of even 
agreed-upon  programs.  Progress  has  also  often  been  hampered  because  of  a 
divergence  among  members  about  the  priority  goals  of  SAARC.  India  has  attached 
primacy to the goal of economic cooperation, while the other members are focused on 
issues of regional stability, security, and development. Moreover, SAARC has suffered 
from a leadership vacuum since members cannot develop consensus on specific issues. 
Consequently,  SAARC  initiatives  have  made  progress  only  when  tensions  among 
members were low and political relations were relatively normal. Whenever inter-state 
relations  deteriorated,  progress  stopped  altogether.  The  constraining  role  of  regional 
politics on SAARC operations is reflected in the fact that 10 out of 24 possible SAARC 
Summits  since  the  organization‘s  founding  have  had  to  be  cancelled  or  postponed 
because of poor political conditions.
5   
 
Another major constraint on SAARC‘s performance has been the lack of  institutional 
capacity  to  support  and  monitor  implementation  of  its  initiatives.
6  The  SAARC 
Secretariat,  while  well  organized,  suffers  from  inadequate  budgetary  and  human 
resources, and lacks technical and professional expertise to plan, monitor, and support 
implementation of SAARC initiatives. Moreover, the Secretariat also lacks a mandate to 
initiate proposals and explore possibilities for expanding cooperation. As such, it has 
been  unable  to  actively  help  in  converting  high-level  recommendations  and  summit 
meeting declarations into actionable programs and concrete achievements.   
 
The absence of civil society champions for regional cooperation has also been a factor 
in SAARC‘s mediocre performance. While substantial support for regional cooperation 
exists among constituents of civil societies in all member countries, this has not as yet 
crystallized into informal but effective support groups for cooperation at the regional or 
national levels. As a result, support for regional cooperation from sections of civil society 
(e.g.,  private  sector,  nongovernmental  organizations  [NGOs],  professionals,  and 
academia) does not aggregate into effective demand for cooperation. On the other hand, 
the  presence  of  such  groups  within  SAARC  would  contribute  to  the  more  effective 
articulation of public demand for regional cooperation and put pressure on governments 




                                            
5   Holding the annual summit meetings is mandatory for SAARC members.                                                                             
6   A recent study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2010b) finds that to sustain and guide the 
fast-paced  growth  of  regional/sub-regional  cooperation,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  strengthen 
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5.2  Platform for Leaders’ Meetings 
 
SAARC‘s failure to effectively promote cooperation in trade and other economic areas 
has  been  sufficiently  highlighted  in  several  studies.  However,  SAARC‘s  significant 
achievements  in  non-economic  areas  have  remained  largely  unappreciated.  SAARC 
Summits  offer  an  extremely  useful  platform for  the  region‘s  political  leaders  to come 
together  and  interact  with  one  another  in  an  informal  atmosphere.  During  summits, 
leaders  are  free  to  discuss  issues  they  may  choose,  form  impressions  about  one 
another, and revisit their own preconceived ideas and perceptions. The importance of 
such  interactions  cannot  be  overstated  in  a  region  marked  by  persistent  mutual 
suspicion,  recrimination,  and  confusion.  In  such  an  environment  there  are  very  few 
occasions for leaders to meet and informally sound out their counterparts without the 
pressure of having to bargain hard that usually accompanies bilateral meetings in the 
region.  
 
Thanks to SAARC, the region‘s leaders have had opportunities to meet and interact with 
one another dozens of times over the past 2 decades. On a majority of these occasions, 
the  leaders‘  informal  interactions  on  the  sidelines  of  SAARC  Summits  contributed  to 
lowered  tensions  and  improved  understanding,  which  in  some  instances  also  led  to 
important  breakthroughs  and  political  initiatives.  In  particular,  a  meeting  between  the 
Indian Prime Minister and Sri Lankan President at the 1986 SAARC Summit produced a 
significant  peace  accord  between  the  two  countries  in  the  following  year.  Likewise, 
meetings of the leaders of India and Pakistan at various summits have led to important 
outcomes, including the diffusion of tensions, agreement on mutual nuclear installations, 
and a re-launching of the peace process, among others. Some observers have noted 
that  such  outcomes  probably  may  not  have  materialized  in  the  absence  of  SAARC 
Summits. Perhaps in recognition of SAARC‘s unique role in this respect, no member has 
shown indifference to its fate. Whenever SAARC‘s continued existence has come under 
threat, all members have collectively acted to diffuse the crisis and save SAARC from 
any potential fallout. 
 
SAARC‘s unique ability to bring leaders together in a broader regional framework is in 
itself  a  highly  significant  contribution  to  strengthening  the  spirit  and  process  of 
cooperation  in  the  region. The  idea  of  regional  cooperation  may  be  getting  stronger 
among  SAARC  members.  For  instance,  members‘  willingness  to  establish  the  South 
Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), despite the unsatisfactory outcomes of SAPTA, probably 
reflects their assessment that SAARC can effectively safeguard and possibly expand 
their  market  access  in  the  region,  rather  than  waiting  indefinitely  for  multilateral 
negotiations to be completed. While SAFTA is not free from issues and problems, there 
seems to be greater commitment to its implementation than was evident for SAPTA. 
 
5.3  The Prospects 
 
The  introduction  of  SAFTA  in  2006  is  one  of  the  most  significant  achievements  of 
SAARC.  The  SAARC  Secretary  General  observed  in  2009  that  SAFTA  ―creates  an 
enabling basis, hitherto non-existent, for regional trade in South Asia. It is path breaking 
in that sense. SAFTA thus has the potential to drive SAARC economies towards building 
a tariff-free trade regime in South Asia. Moreover, tariff liberalization in [the] goods trade  
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under SAFTA can be expected to be accompanied by the similar liberalization of trade in 
services and investment activities, and in general contribute to accelerated deepening of 
cooperation and integration in South Asia.‖  
 
The performance of SAFTA to date, however, does not support such expectations. To 
begin  with,  deficiencies  in  SAFTA‘s  design  have  affected  its  functioning  and 
effectiveness.  Adoption of the ―negative lists‖ approach has resulted in keeping more 
than one-half of current trade from being affected by tariff reduction commitments made 
under SAFTA. Moreover, as there is no formal and binding provision requiring members 
to  shrink  their  respective  negative  lists  by  an  agreed  date,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
perpetuate such lists. In order to jump start the process of dismantling negative lists, 
India announced in 2008 a unilateral reduction in its negative list for least developed 
countries (LDCs) by removing 264 items and promised further reductions of 20% every 
year. The response from other members, however, has not been encouraging. Secondly, 
SAFTA‘s unhurried and back-loaded schedule for tariff reduction over a 7–10 year period 
has also reduced the incentive for members to initiate tariff cutting in early years since 
the benefits from tariff reductions are likely to be realized only in later years. Moreover, 
SAFTA remains confined only to the trade in goods and it has not vigorously attempted 
to bring into its scope the trade in services and investments.  
 
In addition to such problems, the pace of trade liberalization and expansion in the region 
remains heavily governed by inter-state relations among SAARC members, particularly 
those between India and Pakistan. Both countries continue to maintain special lists and 
restrictive  trade  policies  and  practices  against  each  other,  effectively  negating  the 
prospects of major trade expansion under SAFTA. 
 
Perhaps as a result of these constraints, the introduction of SAFTA has not yet made 
much  contribution  to  the  expansion  of  intra-regional  trade.  It  is  estimated  to  have 
generated less than US$300 million in additional intra-regional trade, which is only about 
1%  of  total  trade  since  SAFTA‘s  inception  (Weerakoon,  2009).  More  importantly,  the 
persistence of problematic inter-state relations means that agreement on any significant 
initiative for trade liberalization and economic integration under SAFTA will be extremely 
slow in arriving.  
 
Perhaps  prompted  by  this  consideration,  several  SAARC  members  have  begun  to 
vigorously  pursue  bilateral  and  plurilateral  trade  arrangements  with  fellow  SAARC 
members as well as with non-members. India, for instance, has concluded bilateral free 
trade agreements with all SAARC members except Bangladesh and Pakistan. Since it 
has made an offer to negotiate an FTA with Bangladesh, it may soon have an FTA with 
all  SAARC  members  except  Pakistan.  These  other  SAARC  members  are  exploring 
similar arrangements with one or more fellow SAARC members. Five SAARC members 
are  also  actively  pursuing  an  FTA  together  with  two  non-SAARC  members  under  a 
plurilateral arrangement known as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical 
and  Economic  Cooperation  (BIMSTEC).
7  Likewise,  three  SAARC  members 
                                            
7   The  Bay  of  Bengal  Initiative  for  Multisectoral  Technical  and  Economic  Cooperation  (BIMSTEC) 
comprises five SAARC countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and two non-
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(Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka) are exploring opportunities available under the Asia 
Pacific  Trade  Agreement  (APTA),  which  also  has  three  non-SAARC  countries  as 
members (the PRC, Republic of Korea, and Lao PDR). The obvious advantage of this 
strategy for India and other SAARC members is to make progress on major issues, such 
as the liberalization of trade in services and investment activities, through bilateral or 
plurilateral platforms, with those who are ready to join rather than settle for the lowest 
common area of agreement among all members.  
 
The other strand of this development is the deepening of India‘s trade and economic 
relations with the ASEAN+3 states.
8 India has signed an FTA with ASEAN as a whole as 
well as with some of its individual members. India‘s trade with ASEAN+3 has risen much 
faster than with fellow SAARC members between 2000 and 2007. The share of trade 
with ASEAN+3  in  India‘s  total  trade  increased  from  about  17%  to  27%,  while  intra-
SAARC trade barely increased from 2.4% to 2.7% during the same period. Moreover, 
India is also involved in FTA discussions with several other members of ASEAN as well 
as with the PRC, Japan and Republic of Korea, among others. India seems engaged in 
rapidly building up a more comprehensive and deeper relationship with ASEAN+3 that 
would  also  include  trade  in  services  and  investment  activities,  which  makes  it  an 
important  player  in  the  Pan-Asian  economic  integration  process  that  appears  to  be 
emerging (Francois, Wignaraja, and Rana [eds.], 2009).   
 
Such developments could lead to India becoming a bridge connecting South Asia to East 
Asia, given that it accounts for nearly 78% of intra-SAARC trade. If such a development 
eventuates, smaller SAARC economies may find it attractive to plug into broader Asian 
markets through their preferential bilateral ties with India rather than under their own 
strength.  The  considerable  market  access  unilaterally  granted  by  India  to  smaller 
SAARC  member  countries  through  several  bilateral  and  regional  arrangements  is 
expected to facilitate such a process.   
 
This situation could have significant implications for SAFTA. The market access provided 
by  India  to  smaller  SAARC  economies  under  bilateral  and  regional  arrangements 
considerably exceeds that available under SAFTA. As such, Bhutan, the Maldives, and 
Sri Lanka show little interest in making use of SAFTA. At present, only Bangladesh, 
which has so far not entered into any preferential bilateral arrangement with India, has 
shown a keenness for trading under SAFTA. However, it remains to be seen whether 
this  keenness  can  be  sustained  in  the  event  it  concludes  any  preferential  trade 
arrangements  with  India.  It  is,  therefore,  likely  that  much  of  the  prospective  trade 
liberalization and growth in South Asia may take place outside the framework of SAFTA.  
 
Pakistan is absent from much of the bilateral and plurilateral preferential arrangements 
among SAARC members, especially those involving India. However, Pakistan is also in 
discussions  with  several  SAARC  members  for  making  preferential  arrangements. 
Moreover, it has already signed an FTA with the PRC and is in discussions with the Gulf 
Coordination  Council,  ASEAN,  and  several  member  countries  of ASEAN.  Therefore, 
Pakistan also appears to be pursuing trade liberalization and economic integration under 
                                            
8   ASEAN+3 comprises the 10 member countries of ASEAN plus the PRC, Japan, and Republic of 
Korea.  
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bilateral  and  plurilateral  arrangements  within  and  outside  South Asia,  perhaps    at  a 
slower pace than India.   
 
Significant  progress  towards  trade  liberalization  and  economic  cooperation  can  be 
expected  in  South Asia  in  the  near  future.  However,  such  progress  will  likely  come 
mostly  in  a  fragmented  manner  from  SAARC  members  working  individually  or  in 
subgroups, rather than together under SAARC‘s auspices. These emerging trends in 
member  countries‘  respective  strategies  for  trade  growth  and  liberalization  will  likely 
dilute  SAARC‘s  role  in  that  dimension.    Nonetheless,  as  the  only  entity  capable  of 
bringing the region‘s  leaders together,  SAARC is in a unique position to play a very 
important  role  by  actively  soliciting  consideration  of  regional  issues  that  can  only  be 
resolved with the cooperation of several or all members. In the absence of members 
agreeing to cooperate, such issues will continue to remain unresolved, thereby causing 
damage  to  all.  By  acting  as  an  objective  intermediary,  the  SAARC  Secretariat  can 
present  an  issue  directly  to  the  region‘s  leaders  and  fast-track  the  processes  of 
consideration  and  in-principle  endorsement  (or  rejection)  at  the  highest  level.  For 
example,  one  such  issue  that  needs  urgent  cooperative  action  by  SAARC  members 
concerns the development and management of shared water resources in the region. 
 
5.4  Optimal Development of Water Resources 
 
The  Ganges–Brahmputra–Meghna  (GBM)  and  the  Indus  rivers  are  the  major  shared 
river systems within SAARC. While both originate in the Tibet region of the PRC, they 
are of critical importance to several SAARC countries, including Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India,  Nepal,  and  Pakistan.  Together,  two  river  basins  touch  the  lives  of  about  700 
million people and can potentially impact nearly 100 million hectares of arable land. They 
also hold identified hydropower potential of more than 100,000 MW and supply 25% to 
65% of water available to different riparian. As such, these water resources constitute an 
extremely valuable asset within the SAARC region (Rangachari, 2009). 
 
The optimal development and management of these water resources has the potential to 
change the face of the SAARC region by (i) bringing under control the annually recurring 
destructive floods, (ii) providing irrigation for several million hectares of arable land, (iii) 
generating thousands of megawatts of electrical energy, and (iv) opening up extensive 
networks of waterways and fisheries. Such developments can generate livelihoods for 
millions and fight the massive poverty that characterizes the SAARC region. Extensive 
technical work and investigations by expert groups confirm the potential for and urgency 
of launching cooperative action.  
 
Expectedly, however, there are also longstanding disputes and conflicts among SAARC 
members regarding the development and sharing of these water resources. Unilateral 
and bilateral efforts by members over the last  6 decades have not led to worthwhile 
cooperation  in  the  matter.  The  two  major  regional  agreements  covering  these 
resources—the  World-Bank-brokered  Indus  River  Treaty  (1960)  between  India  and 
Pakistan, and the Farakka Treaty (1996) between India and Bangladesh—focused on 
finding a workable formula to share water between two countries. There was, however, 
no  attempt  to  address  the  larger  issue  of  cooperation  for  optimal  development  and 
management of the water resources of the two river systems. As there has been not The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia  |       25 
 
 
much  progress  in  this  area  to  date,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  launch  major  new 
initiatives to push for cooperation among SAARC members.  
 
SAARC  can  mobilize  members  to  address  two  major  constraints  that  have  been 
identified as preventing cooperation among member states: (i) the lack of trust among 
countries and (ii) the absence of a collective stake in cooperation among member states 
(Vergese and Iyer  [eds.],1993). 
  
The building of trust has to be undertaken by the countries themselves since trust is a 
product  of  multiple  interrelated  events  and  experiences—historical  as  well  as 
contemporary.  However,  SAARC,  as  a  multilateral  entity,  can  take  the  initiative  to 
highlight an objective assessment of what can be achieved by each member country 
through  cooperation  with  others.  Through  analyses  and  dialogue,  SAARC  can  also 
demonstrate  that  substantial  and  mutually  reinforcing  interests  can  emerge  under  its 
cooperative framework.  SAARC can mobilize the expertise and funds needed for this 
work  by  engaging  multilateral  and  bilateral  development  partners,  and  ensuring  that 
efforts remain  transparent and credible. Development partners, particularly the World 
Bank and ADB, should also promote the development of joint projects in the region— 
hydropower, gas, power transmission lines, cross-border transit routes—to strengthen 
cooperation and highlight the gains from regional cooperation. 
 
5.5  Environmental Concerns 
 
A  related  aspect  of  water  resources  development  is  the  need  to  respond  to 
environmental concerns regarding the Himalayas—the mountain range where the two 
river systems originate. Current assessments indicate that climate change will begin to 
have an adverse impact on snow and glacial melts in the Himalayas, although there is 
presently some dispute about when this may begin to happen. Because such melts are 
an important source of water for the two river basins, especially in dry seasons, the 
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development has strongly recommended 
that SAARC member countries undertake a cooperative program to monitor the changes 
and formulate an effective response.  
 
As the pre-eminent multilateral entity in South Asia, SAARC can play a pivotal role in 
bringing the member states together to take needed action in this extremely important 
area.  In  doing  so,  SAARC  could  leverage  its  two-fold  advantage:  (i)  access  to  the 
region‘s  leaders  and  (ii)  status  as  an  objective  multi-state  institution.  The  failure  of 
SAARC  members  to  work  together  in  harnessing  the  enormous  potential  of  this 
resource, even as grinding poverty persists in the region, would be most unfortunate. 
Since it appears likely that member states will not be able to overcome their differences 
unless seriously prodded by a neutral and competent intermediary, SAARC can make a 
significant contribution by acquiring a mandate for this effort from members and taking 
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6.  Issues 
 
Progress in regional cooperation and integration, even in a truncated form, can bring 
significant benefits to the region. Even more substantial benefits could accrue to South 
Asia if SAARC were to become an effective catalyst for bringing its members together to 
harness  shared  resources  and  manage  the  major  issues  confronting  the  region. 
However, such outcomes are predicated on the successful management of three deficits 
that challenge the region‘s policymakers: (i) the trust deficit among all SAARC members, 
(ii)  the  trade  account  deficit  of  smaller  SAARC  economies  with  India,  and  (iii)  the 
institutional capacity deficit to support regional cooperation. 
 
6.1  Trust Deficit 
 
An  extreme  imbalance  of  power  among  member  states  has  given  rise  to  fears  over 
security resulting from domination by India, and fostered an environment of suspicion 
and  mistrust.  Such  a  situation  generates  built-in  retardants  to  cooperation  among 
members. In the case of SAARC, this process has given rise to several distortions such 
as  avoiding  and/or  restricting  trade  with  India,  discouraging  FDI  coming  from  India, 
creating an unwillingness to work together to resolve regional issues, and externalizing 
bilateral and regional issues.  
 
If  the  environment  of  mistrust  and  suspicion  among  SAARC  members  remains 
unaddressed, it will be a long time before significant progress in regional cooperation 
and economic integration can be realized. This is because cooperation and integration 
requires  aligning  member  states‘  economic  structures  more  closely  with  that  of  the 
Indian economy, which would further deepen interdependence with India. In the absence 
of  trust  and  amid  prevalent  fears  of  Indian  domination,  however,  smaller  SAARC 
members will continue to tread this path very cautiously.    
 
The critical need to develop congenial interstate relations for deepening and accelerating 
the process of cooperation in the region cannot be over-emphasized. While a growing 
awareness  of  the  economic  costs  of  the  lack  of  cooperation  seems  to  have  pushed 
SAARC  members  towards  increased  cooperation  in  recent  years,  the  overarching 
influence  of  inter-state  relations  cannot  be  overlooked.  All  major  achievements  in 
cooperation in the region have materialized only when such relations were reasonably 
favorable.  The  finalization  of  SAFTA  was  delayed  for  several  years  because  of  the 
deterioration of India–Pakistan relations during 1998–2001. The signing of the India–Sri 
Lanka  FTA  and  progress  towards  a  possible  Comprehensive  Economic  Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) was underpinned by India‘s ―hands-off policy‖ on the sensitive issue 
of  the  Tamil  insurgency  after  its  controversial  Indian  Peace  Keeping  Force  (IPKF) 
experience. Similarly, the significant India–Bangladesh initiatives launched in early 2010 
could have only materialized on the back of a major shift in political relations between 
the  two  countries.  As  noted  earlier,  cooperation  in  South Asia  has  progressed  more 
along  the  lines  of  a  bilateral  and/or  plurilateral  basis  than  on  a  region-wide  SAARC 
platform.      
 
As  the  pre-eminent  power  in  South Asia,  and  hence  a  party  to  a  majority  of  other 
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trust building in South Asia. To start, India could show openness and seriousness  in 
exploring   arrangements to allay the security and domination concerns of its neighbors. 
This could involve formal ministerial-level discussions, agreements, and pacts, as well 
as  including  informal  channels  provided  by  civil  society  organizations  and  people-to-
people  contacts.  Likewise,  India  could  also  give  consideration  to  revisiting  past 
reservations about the inclusion of security issues, and perhaps also bilateral issues, in 
the SAARC agenda. Such efforts would signal India‘s firm intent to develop closer and 
collegial  relationships  with  neighbors,  and  help  dispel  their  misunderstandings  while 
building confidence in Indian intentions. 
 
Such  developments  would  require  significant  changes  in  India‘s  traditional  policy 
towards neighboring countries. Fortunately, there is now increasing recognition in India 
that  it has much more to gain than just a marginal increase in its exports from a more 
congenial South Asia. India would also significantly benefit from valuable externalities 
emanating  from  improved  regional  cooperation.  For  example,  India  is  likely  to  gain 
enhanced credibility in global forums if and when it is seen to be the anchor in a stable 
and congenial region, rather than a hostile one. Such gains would strengthen India‘s 
claims to assuming a bigger role on the global stage. India would also gain by reducing 
the space for non-regional players to insert themselves into regional matters, thereby 
alleviating  security  and  strategic  pressures  currently  facing  India.  In  order  to  realize 
these gains, India should be prepared to be accommodating, if not generous, whenever 
possible in negotiating with its neighbors by avoiding the temptation to insist on strict 
reciprocities and technicalities in all matters.  
 
India seems to have signaled a major shift towards such an approach during the recent 
visit of the Bangladeshi Prime Minister. In a spirit of cooperation and appreciation of 
each other‘s needs, several important and long-pending issues were addressed during 
this visit.
9 If this spirit is sustained and consistently adopted by India, and if it inspires 
other SAARC states to do likewise, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister‘s visit could turn out 
to be a game-changing event for SAARC.   
 
Of course, other SAARC members would also need to fully involve themselves in the 
process of  trust building and re-examine their own long-held attitudes and strategies 
towards cooperation with India and other fellow member states. On their part, they would 
need  to  acknowledge  India‘s  centrality  to  the  South  Asian  region.  They  need  to 
appreciate that an approach of accommodation and cooperation is likely to be more 
productive and sustainable in the long run than that of suspicion and externalization.   
 
Improved political relations and cohesion among member states should reduce tensions 
and promote stability in the SAARC region. While economic integration would result in 
enhanced mutual dependency vis-à-vis India, it would also promote faster growth and 
peaceful  co-existence.  Integration  can  thus  become  an  effective  option  for  SAARC 
                                            
9   These include agreements on (i) access for Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan to each other‘s territory 
through Indian territory; (ii) access to India to its Northeast region through Bangladeshi ports; (iii) a 
grant of US$1.0 billion credit to Bangladesh; (iv) a commitment to the early resolution of  water-
sharing  issues,  and  (v)  the  signing  of  the  Bangladesh–India  Trade  Agreement  (BITA)  and  the 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA).  
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member countries to overcome impediments imposed by their respective market sizes 
and  geography.  More  importantly,  several  issues  of  critical  importance  to  member 
states—such  as  the  development  of  common  water  resources,  protection  of  the 
Himalayan  environment,  prevention  of  cross-border  crime  and  terrorism,  and  health 
epidemics—cannot  be  adequately  resolved  without  cooperation  among  members, 
especially India. The failure to cooperate can only result in sub-optimal solutions that 
deprive  the  region  and  its  residents  of  the  significant  gains  that  could  otherwise  be 
realized through cooperation. 
 
6.2  Trade Deficit 
 
Between 60% and 90% of the intra-regional trade of all SAARC member states, except 
Pakistan  and Afghanistan,  is  with  India.  India‘s  more  diversified  and  relatively-better-
developed  economy  makes  it  a  competitive  supplier  of  several  imports  to  SAARC‘s 
smaller economies. With trade liberalization, the imports of smaller economies from India 
are growing very rapidly. On the other hand, owing to their relatively narrow resource 
base and less diversified economies, they are unable to increase exports to India in a 
corresponding manner. This imbalance between imports and exports vis-à-vis India is in 
the  ratio  of  10:1  and  even  widening  in  some  instances.  This  has  given  rise  to 
unacceptably high and mounting trade deficits with India and prompted serious concerns 
across the region. However, to the extent that less expensive Indian imports replace 
more costly imports from other sources, the trade balance of importing countries would 
improve on a global basis even while it may deteriorate vis-à-vis India. While such a shift 
might make for sound economics, practical considerations—such as the availability of 
tied  bilateral  grants  and  export  credits  from  other  sources,  and  concerns  about 
overdependence on a single supply source—dictate that a trade deficit with any single 
country cannot be sustained beyond a certain point. This means that trade imbalances 
with India have to be addressed if the goal of more free trade in South Asia is to be 
pursued. 
 
To correct trade imbalances with India and others in a sustainable manner, the smaller 
SAARC economies need to offer similar products of interest at competitive prices. These 
smaller  economies  need  to  diversify  and  upgrade  production  structures  by  investing 
large  amounts  of  capital  and  harnessing  newer    technologies.  This  underscores  the 
urgent need for smaller countries to put in place policies and facilities to attract large 
amounts of FDI, including from India.
10 Similarly, it also argues strongly for operating a 
well-funded development assistance facility by India and other SAARC members, with 
support  from  bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  to  help  LDC  members  to  diversify  and 
upgrade  their  economies.  Thus,  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  activate  and  sufficiently 
strengthen  the  SAARC  Development  Fund.  Meanwhile,  progress  towards  market 
openings on the part of the smaller SAARC economies will be governed by their ability to 
maintain an acceptable trade balance with India and other trade partners. 
 
 
                                            
10   The India–Sri Lanka FTA has encouraged FDI flows in both directions  and led to enhanced Sri 
Lankan exports to India. This has contributed to a reduction in the adverse trade balance of Sri 
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6.3  Institutional Capacity Deficit 
 
Major  SAARC  initiatives—such  as  on  poverty  alleviation  and  the  suppression  of 
terrorism—failed  to  deliver  the  intended  benefits  to  the  region  because  of  ineffective 
implementation. It is, therefore, necessary for SAARC to develop capacity for monitoring 
the implementation of its initiatives if it is to deliver better results to the region. SAARC 
needs to provide its Secretariat with the necessary mandate and resources to monitor 
and evaluate implementation of its programs and initiatives. A strengthened Secretariat 
would  monitor  implementation  of  the  agreed-upon  initiatives,  identify  problems,  and 
suggest  necessary  corrective  actions  for  consideration  by  concerned  member 
governments. Such a process would help in eliciting needed attention to implementation 
problems  and  enhance  the  chances  for  the  successful  and  timely  achievement  of 
objectives. It would replace the existing apathetic attitude to implementation and make 
the  national  and  regional  implementing  entities  more  accountable  to  member 
governments and SAARC. Consistent oversight by the Secretariat can be expected to 
improve the implementation and outcomes of SAARC activities.   
 
A strengthened Secretariat could also be expected to guide and support the activities of 
various  regional  centers  more  effectively.  This  would  enable  regional  centers  to 
undertake valuable cooperative groundwork in their respective issue areas. The ready 
availability  of  such  outputs  would  facilitate  the  quicker  crystallization  of  specific 
opportunities for bilateral and regional cooperation. For instance, India and Bangladesh‘s 
recent decision to enter into a power sharing and transmission agreement across the 
border could be fast-tracked by the ready availability of relevant studies and a blueprint 
drawn up as part of the Secretariat's work over the past few years.
11 With its closer 
interactions with regional centers and national implementing entities in the region, the 
Secretariat could also undertake the exchange of information and best practices across 
member countries, particularly in areas such as rural development, income generation 
for the poor, and primary health and education.  
 
To successfully carry out such functions, however, the Secretariat would need to have 
access to high quality and experienced expertise in different fields relevant to SAARC 
activities. It would  also need to develop  its capacity to offer competent analysis and 
objective  advice  to  member  governments  on  the  problems  and  issues  encountered. 
Over time, when the Secretariat gains recognition as a source of competent analysis and 
objective  advice,  the  smaller  states  would  use  its  products  to  supplement  their  own 
inadequate  capacity  and  expertise  in  various  fields.  Such  support  could  improve 
interactions among SAARC members, since all would have an enhanced understanding 
of the issues under consideration.   
 
SAARC member states would need to find modalities for delegating enhanced authority 
to the Secretariat and empowering it to undertake such activities on its behalf if SAARC 
were to serve its population more effectively. Member states would need to also consider 
                                            
11   The author is grateful to Mr. Ashis Bannerji of Global Equations Allahabad for bringing this example 
to  the  author‘s  attention  and  sharing  ideas  on  enhancing  institutional  capacity  for  regional 
cooperation.     
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creating enhanced self-standing budgets for the Secretariat with support from the donor 
community.  
 
Donors can play a very important role not only by making additional resources available 
to Secretariat, but also by helping to strengthen  its professionalism in preparing and  
driving  policy  inputs  through  interactions  with  civil  society  and  other  institutions  in 
member countries. Donor involvement would also help to enhance the transparency and 
credibility of the Secretariat‘s products. 
 
Another  action  that  would  significantly contribute  to  improving  SAARC‘s  performance 
concerns the development of support groups representing various elements from civil 
society in favor of regional cooperation. Such groups exist in all member countries and 
comprise sections of the private sector, academia, professionals, and non-governmental 
organizations from different fields. These groups need to be encouraged to evolve into 
informal  networks  within  and  across  SAARC  member  countries  to  more  effectively 
represent the cause of regional cooperation. Through public education and advocacy, 
such groups could generate a supportive environment for cooperation, articulate public 
demand,  and  strengthen  governments‘  commitment  to  cooperation  even  while 
demanding  greater  accountability  for  results.  Participating  individuals  and  institutions, 
such  as  think  tanks,  would  contribute  to  preparing  studies,  analysis,  and  other 
knowledge  products  on  issues  and  opportunities  for  regional  cooperation;  and 
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